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I N T R O D U C T I O N  
In supporting the freedom of navigation principle, Grotius argued in 1609 that 
navigation was an innocuous activity, causing neither danger nor harm to any 
State.' Further evolution has proven ad libitum that, whatever the merits of the 
said principle might be, Grotius' assertion cannot be held true nowadays. 
I Huig de Groot, (1609), De jure praedae commentarius, ex Auctoris Codice descripsit et 
vulgavit, H.G. Hamaker, Hagae Comitum, 1868, p. 228. 
When the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) was 
adopted in 1982, it was already evident in practice that maritime transport of oil 
might have severe adverse effects for the environment and the economic interests 
of the affected coastal States, as a source of operative and accidental pollution. 
However, UNCLOS confirmed the paramount rank of the freedom of navigation 
principle, and the correlative outstanding role of the flag State with respect to its 
exercise, while trying to strike some balance by upholding the prescriptive and 
enforcement powers of coastal States and, mostly, port S t a t e  .2
In the absence of adequate preventive and protective international rules, coastal 
States have resorted in the past to unilateral measures, such as the ones adopted 
by Canada in 1975, through the Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act,3 by the 
USA in 1990, through the Oil Pollution Act, and by the European Union in 1995 
after the accident of the Erika on the French coast. The reaction of coastal States 
affected by oil spills after a long series of increasingly catastrophic accidents 
shows that they are no longer willing to suffer similar environmental and economic 
disasters in the future. The fact that there is no coastal State free from the risk of 
being polluted by oil resulting from the operation of vessels, as well as the 
increasing frequency of oil spills with catastrophic environmental and economic 
dimensions, also support the trend towards the adoption of stricter internationally 
agreed measures concerning safer navigation of vessels devoted to oil transport. 
We shall summarize hereafter the main measures taken by Spain and other 
coastal States after the accident of the oil tanker Prestige and further actions pro- 
moted in regional (European Union, EU) and global organizations (International 
Maritime Organization, IMO), in order to improve the existing international legal 
framework. 
2 We do not intend to review here the extent of the powers granted by UNCLOS to the 
different categories of States concerned with freedom of navigation with respect to pol- 
lution from ships; in Spanish legal doctrine this question has been examined inter alia 
by: Juste Ruiz, J., Derecho internacional del medio ambiente, Madrid (McGraw-Hill) 
1999, pp. 167-175; Bou Franch, V., "Riflessione sulle misure di prevenzione dell'in- 
quinamento marino dopo l'incidente della Prestige". In: M. C. Ciciriello (ed.), Ga pro- 
tezione del Mare Mediterraneo dall'inquinamento. Problemi vecchi e nuovi, 2003, Ed. 
Scientifica, Napoli, pp. 27-70. See also, with respect to the Prestige accident: Revista 
Espanola de Derecho lnternacional, vol. LV-2003, n. 1, with articles by Fernandez De 
Casadevante Romanf, C.; Fernandez Tomas, A.; Juste Ruiz, J.; Pueyo Losa,1./Lirola Delgado, 
I./Jorge Urbina, J.; Sobrino Heredia, J.M. 
3 According to the declaration made by the Canadian Prime Minister, Mr. Pierre Trudeau 
in support of the Act: "Where no law exists, or where law is clearly insufficient, there 
is no international common law applying to the Arctic Seas, we are saying somebody 
has to preserve this area for mankind until the international law develops. And we are 
prepared to help it develop by taking steps on our own and eventually, if there is a con- 
ference of nations concerned with the Arctic, we will of course be a very active mem- 
ber in such a conference and try to establish an international regime. But, in the 
meantime, we had to act now". ILM, 1970, p. 600. 
I. R E S P O N S E  T O  T H E  O I L  S P I L L  A N D  S U B S E Q U E N T  
M E A S U R E S  
1. Intervention at sea and contingency action 
Intervention in the event of an accident at sea which might cause pollution dam- 
age to a coastal State, in order "to take and enforce measures", is permitted by 
international law only when a maritime casualty has occurred or the threat of it is 
"imminent" (UNCLOS, Article 221).' This attributive rule has nonetheless serious 
shortcomings, namely: it leaves to the ship's Master the power to decide at which 
moment a "casualty" is declared; it does not provide for preventive notification of 
the risk to the coastal State; and it only permits the coastal State to intervene once 
the pollution or threat of pollution "following" upon a maritime casualty may rea- 
sonably be expected to result in "major harmful consequences". 
In the case of the Prestige, the "Mayday" was given by the Captain on Wed- 
nesday 13 November 2002, at 15.30 hours, when the ship was approximately 28 
miles off the West Coast of Galicia (Spain) in severe stormy weather conditions. 
The tanker started listing and leaking significant amounts of heavy fuel oil while 
it was some 30 km off Cape Finisterre. The ship was in danger of sinking because 
of a 35 metre crack in the starboard side of the hull. Whatever the term employed 
for the description of the situation could be (incident, accident, emergency, dis- 
tress), it does not seem dubious that it constituted a "casualty" empowering the 
coastal State to adopt prescriptive and enforcement measures under Article 221 of 
UNCLOS and the 1969 Intervention Convention. 
Upon the request of the Captain, the Spanish maritime authorities airlifted off 
the crew, with the exception of the Master and two other crew members who 
stayed on board to receive the assistance of a tug, before also being airlifted off. 
Following instructions from the owner and his insurer, the Dutch salvage company 
"SMIT" took control of the vessel. The ship was towed to open seas, and while 
there were on-going discussions about where it could find a safe haven to transfer 
its cargo to another ship, the situation deteriorated on board. Over the following 
five days the tanker in distress was towed first to the North-East, until approach- 
ing nearly three miles off the coast, then to the North-West departing some 90 
miles from the shore and then South and South-West to the outer part of the 
Spanish EEZ. During its erratic itinerary, in a situation described as "close to sab- 
otage", the ship released an estimated 25,000 tonnes of its heavy fuel oil cargo, 
producing a catastrophic impact on the neighbouring west coast of Galicia and on 
the North Coast of Spain, France, and Portugal.' The Prestige sank on 19 November 
4 See also: International Convention relating to Intervention in the High Seas in Cases of 
Oil Pollution Casualties, 1969, as amended, and Protocol relating to Intervention in the 
High Seas in Cases of Pollution by Substances other than Oil, 1973. 
5 Traces of oil were detected even in the United Kingdom (the Channel Islands, Isle of 
Wight and Kent). 
2002 some 260 km west of the Spanish coast with some 13,800 tonnes of heavy 
oil in its tanks. 
According to the IMO Convention on Oil Pollution Preparedness, Response and 
Co-operation of 1990 (OPRC Convention),6 t he  ship should have applied its own 
onboard contingency plan, something that became difficult once the members of 
the crew were airlifted off immediately after notification of the casualty. Spain 
applied its own National Contingency Plan on Marine Pollution established, in 
application of the OPRC Convention and Article 87 of the Spanish Ports and 
Merchant Shipping Act, by a Ministerial Order of 23 February 2001. 
The implementation of the Spanish National Contingency Plan on Marine 
Pollution in the case at hand has given rise to much controversy, both technical 
and political, principally concerning the option taken by the Spanish Government 
to tow the Prestige away from the Spanish coasts.7 Whereas this type of decision 
is always open to criticism, several elements should be taken into consideration 
when legally assessing the option taken by the Spanish authorities. In the first 
place, the duty of the coastal State to render assistance (Article 98.2 of UNCLOS) 
does not in any way require it to take one specific course of action such as, for 
instance, towing a ship in a casualty situation to a place of refuge in or near its 
coasts. Moreover, at the time of the accident, there were no global, regional or 
national rules imposing legal obligations with respect to places or ports of refuge8 
on coastal States. With that in view, given the circumstances of this case,9 and con- 
sidering the consistent international practice in cases such as this,'O it should not 
come as a surprise that Spain exerted its right to order the ship far from the 
Spanish coast. The right to protect "their coastline or related interests, including 
fishing" from pollution or threat of pollution constitutes the ultimate interest of the 
coastal State when dealing with maritime casualties, as recognized in Article 221.1 
of UNCLOS. If, in the case of the Prestige, this right was exerted beyond all rea- 
6 Spain ratified the OPRC Convention on 3 December 1993 (Boletin Oficial del Estado, 5 
June 1995). 
1 For a quite complete legal assessment of the implementation of Spain's 2001 National 
Accidental Sea Pollution Contingency Plan in the case of the Prestige catastrophe see 
Meilan Gil, J. L., (Director), Problemas juridico-administrativos planteados por el 
Prestige, Thomson-Aranzadi, 2005, pp. 121-143. 
8 As an informative document of IMO recognizes "these provisions (of UNCLOS, 
SOLAS, and the SALVAGE Conventions) do not themselves give a right to entry into 
a place of refuge, nor do they explicitly refer to the question of a coastal State's oblig- 
ation to establish places of refuge. On the other hand, neither do they preclude such a 
principle". See "Places of refuge" - addressing the problem of providing place of refuge 
to vessels in distress (available at: |··1138 0 1 |)|··827 0 1 |.|·" typ="DEC2" xbd="1145" xhg="789" ybd="2228" yhg="2193" ID="I22.39.7">�http://www.imo.org>). 
9 That is, mainly: poor navigability of the ship, collapse of the engines, extremely bad 
weather conditions, increasing risk of sinking, specially noxious character of the cargo, 
increasing amount of the oil spill, absence of advisable places or ports of refuge, oppo- 
sition by local authorities and populations, etc. 
10 The action taken by Spain with respect to the casualty of the Prestige, directing it far 
away from the Spanish coastline, constitutes common practice in the field. One 
sonable standards," this would only be determined, absent any claim for the 
responsibility of Spain for an international wrongful act, when a final decision is 
taken in the proceedings pending before national Courts, in Spain and abroad.'2 
The type of oil carried by the Prestige was very persistent and difficult to clean 
up, and it took a massive amount of national and international cooperation, both 
by Government officials and by civil volunteers, to cope with the pollution caused 
by the disaster. Major clean-up operations were carried out at sea and on shore in 
Spain using vessels from Spain and nine other European countries and collect- 
ing around 141,000 tonnes of oily waste. After completing these clean up opera- 
tions on the Spanish coasts, removal of the oil from the wreck was successfully 
achieved between May and October 2004 by the Spanish oil company Repsol 
YPEI3 T h e  cargo remaining in the wreck was removed using aluminium shuttle 
containers filled by gravity through holes cut in the tanks. Some 13,000 tonnes of 
heavy fuel oil were removed from the forepart of the wreck and approximately 
700 tonnes were left in the aft section and treated with biological agents aimed at 
accelerating the degradation of the oil. The estimated cost of this operation was 
100 million. 
Whatever the final judgement about the efficiency (or inefficiency) of the con- 
tingency action developed by the Spanish authorities in executing the National 
Contingency Plan should be, it should be recognized that two years after the cat- 
astrophe, clean up operations have been completed and the remaining fuel on the 
wreck has been successfully removed and transferred to land. In addition, as we 
shall see later on," economic aids and other promotional measures to alleviate the 
situations of those affected have been implemented, and payments for compensa- 
tions for damages have been anticipated to victims. 
2. Unilateral and bilaterally agreed measures concerning certain oil tankers 
The first strictly unilateral legal measure adopted by Spain after the accident of 
the Prestige was the enactment of Royal Decree-Act No. 9/2002, of 13 December 
cont. 
significant case occurred in December 2001-January 2002, when the damaged tanker 
Castor was towed around the Mediterranean Sea for over a month before a place could 
be found where a successful lightering operation could be carried out. See: "Places 
of refuge" - addressing the problem of providing place of refuge to vessels in distress. 
doc. cit. 
" Art. 300 of UNCLOS provides that States Parties "shall exercise the rights, jurisdiction 
and freedoms recognized in this Convention in a manner that would not constitute an 
abuse of right". 
12 See infra. II, 3. 
" The ambitious operation for the recovery of the oil in the wreck was completed on 27 
October 2004 "with a degree of success that surprised even those responsible for the 
extraction". Lloyd's List, 15 November 2004 (n. 58788), p. 10. 
ia Infra, II, 2. 
1992.15 According to this Royal Decree-Act, from 1 January 2003 onwards the 
entering into Spanish ports of single hull oil tankers, flying whatever flag, and car- 
rying heavy fuel oil, tar, bitumen or heavy crude oil is forbidden and, in case of 
violation of the ban, sanctioned with a fine of up to 3 million. As far as this legal 
measure concerns exclusively the entering into Spanish ports and does not affect 
international navigation through other Spanish maritime zones in any other way, 
its conformity with International Law is not questioned. 16 
Yet, before the oil spill caused by the Prestige reached the French Atlantic 
coasts," Spain and France held their fifteenth bilateral summit at Malaga (Spain), 
on 26 November 2002. On this date, the competent Ministers of the two States 
issued a Joint Communiquél8 starting with the assertion that both States coincided 
in considering the "unavoidable necessity" of adopting measures in order to 
impede in the future the repetition of ecological disasters caused by "substan- 
dard" oil tankers such as the Erika on the French coasts or the Prestige on the 
Spanish coasts. The agreement reached by both States implied the undertaking to 
promote different measures that should be adopted by different international orga- 
nizations, such as the European Union, the IMO or other international fora, as 
well as the adoption of immediate measures by the two States. The first para- 
graph of point 4 of this Joint Communique stated that Spain and France agreed 
to elaborate proposals, in the field of the International Law of the Sea, allowing 
Member States acting as coastal States to control on a non-discriminatory basis 
and, if necessary, to limit the traffic of ships carrying dangerous goods within the 
exclusive economic zone. Its second paragraph provided for immediate informa- 
tion and intervention measures with respect to certain oil tankers, as it stated the 
following: 
t h i s  Royal Decree-Act was published in the Spanish Boletin Oficial del Estado, 14 December 
2002, No. 299. 
16 Article 112 of the Spanish Act No. 27/1992, of 24 November 1992, concerning National 
Ports and Merchant Shipping states that: "In order to protect the safety of navigation and 
prevent pollution of the marine environment in waters over which Spain exercises sover- 
eignty, sovereign rights or jurisdiction, the Ministry of Public Works and Transport, 
through the ports authorities and the harbour-Masters' offices, may visit, inspect, search, 
seize, initiate legal proceedings and, in general, take any steps deemed necessary in 
respect of ships which infringe or may infringe those legal rights". Before the Prestige 
accident took place, Spain had never invoked Article 112 of this Act as a legal basis for 
the expulsion of any oil tanker from its exclusive economic zone. In fact, before the acci- 
dent of the Prestige, Spain had never expelled any foreign vessel from its maritime zones. 
" On 31 December 2003, the pollution provoked by the Prestige oil spill reached the 
French coasts and the first lumps of oil were washed up on the beaches of the Landes 
and the Gironde. A week later, more than 200 km of the French Atlantic coastline from 
the Spanish border to L'Ile d'Yeu were affected. 
'$ This text has not been officially published in Spain. The authors thank the Comisionado 
del Gobierno para las actuaciones derivadas de la catdstrofe del buque Prestige for his 
readiness to provide them with a copy of this document. 
"Spain and France agree to establish a firm control, in their exclusive economic 
zones, of all ships more than 15 years old, single hull, carrying fuel and tar, 
when they suppose a risk for the protection of the marine environment. For this 
aim, Spain and France will establish a system of detailed information at the entrance 
of their exclusive economic zones allowing, in cases where doubts exist, an 
exhaustive control of the ship in the sea, the result of which could mean the 
obligation of leaving the zone. Spain and France will ask the European Union 
to study the conditions for the generalization of this measure".'9 
In fact, the first news about this agreement was given at the press conference held 
jointly by the President of the Spanish Government, Mr. Jose Maria Aznar, and 
the President of the French Republic, Mr. Jacques Chirac, at the end of the 
fifteenth Spanish-French Summit. At this press conference, the President of the Spanish 
Government began by declaring that: 
"Today Spain and France have wished to take a new step forward, so we will 
adopt jointly agreed measures in our respective exclusive economic zones. 
Hence, we have decided that, from tomorrow onwards, ships built more than 15 
years ago, with a single hull, carrying fuel or tar, not equipped with mecha- 
nisms for measuring the level and pressure of oil and representing a threat for 
our coasts, will be exhaustively controlled". 
This may give rise to the expulsion of these ships from the exclusive economic 
zone if they constitute a danger, except if the authorities of these ships give all the 
complete information about their cargo, their destination, the documents concern- 
ing their flag States, the detailed information on all the operators and all the oper- 
ations affecting the transport that they are carrying out and that there is within 
those ships. In cases of doubt, the pertinent State's specialist will carry out an 
inspection, and of course, if needed, there will be the pertinent consequences if the 
due securities are not given, including the decision of expulsion from the exclu- 
sive economic zones of France or Spain. 
All this is based on Article 56 of the United Nations Convention on the Law 
of the Sea20 and it will enter into force in our exclusive economic zones from 
tomorrow onwards" .21 
19 Private translation. 
z° An additional legal argument was introduced on 30 December 2002, when the Spanish 
Ministry on Transport and Public Works, Mr. Francisco Alvarez-Cascos, during his inter- 
vention before the Infrastructures Commission of the Spanish Congress, declared that: 
"the Spanish Government, as well as the French Government, applying Articles 56 and 
73 of the Convention of the United Nations on the Law of the Sea, began immediately 
to impede the entrance in their exclusive economic zones of those ships that, due to their 
characteristics and cargo, may produce an adverse effect on the marine environment" 
(emphasis added). Private translation. See the document Congreso de los Diputados, (30 
December 2002): Comparecencia del Ministro de Fomento, Francisco Alvarez-Cascos, 
ante la Comision de Infraestructuras. Cit. 
21 Private translation. See Conferencia de prensa del Presidente del Gobierno, Don Jose 
At the same press conference, the President of the French Republic, Mr. 
Jacques Chirac, added the following: 
"Moreover, we have decided, I wish to remind you, that from tomorrow 
onwards all ships with doubtful characteristics (single hull, more than 15 years 
old, carrying heavy fuel or tar) and dangerous for ecosystems can be checked 
and, in cases of infringement of the rules, excluded from our 200 mile zones. 
We will propose to Copenhagen (European Council) the extension of these mea- 
sures to the European countries as a whole, so that they can join us".22 
It is also interesting to note that during this press conference, a journalist asked 
whether this new proposal was in conformity with International Law and, if this 
was the case, why it had not been adopted until that moment. The President of the 
French Republic, Mr. Jacques Chirac, answered this question, saying that: 
"A moment ago, the President of Government, Mr. Aznar, commented that this 
decision is based on Article 56. Why was this policy not proposed before? 
I think that it is, simply, because we have an International Law of the Sea 
that is a kind of historic monument, conceived for guaranteeing an absolute 
freedom of navigation through all the seas in the world and that it was difficult 
to criticize such a monument. Moreover, decisions were in general taken at the 
International Maritime Organization. As you know, there the corridors are 
cont. 
Maria Aznar, y del Presidente de la Republica Francesa, Jacques Chirac (Malaga, 26 
November 2002), 4 pp. The original Spanish document is available at: �http://www.la- |··827 0 1 |.|·" typ="DEC2" xbd="423" xhg="228" ybd="1671" yhg="1645" ID="I26.23.1">moncloa.es>. 
22 Private translation. Ibid. These declarations were published on a widespread basis . Two 
official notes dated the 26 November 2002 from the Spanish Ministry for the Presidency 
and from the Spanish First Vice-Presidency of the Government stated, with the same 
wording, that: "the President of the Government, Jose Maria Aznar, and the President 
of the French Republic, Mr. Jacques Chirac, have agreed today, during the Spanish- 
French Summit held at Malaga, to implement from tomorrow onwards exhaustive con- 
trols for ships more than 15 years old that navigate through the zone of exclusion of 
200 marine miles and carrying dangerous goods such as fuel, tar or of any other type 
and that represent a threat for the coasts of the two States. This decision, adopted by 
both countries, could give rise to the expulsion of the ship navigating through this area, 
except when the authority of the ship offers all the information required, such as the 
information concerning their cargo, operators and destination. In cases of negative 
answers, both States will adopt measures against them, which may include the expulsion 
of these ships from the exclusive economic zones of both countries. The decision 
adopted today by both States has its legal basis in Article 56 of the United Nations Convention 
on the Law of the Sea". Private translation. All declarations and notes issued by the 
Spanish Ministry for the Presidency are available at |··1120 0 1 |.|·" typ="DEC2" xbd="1398" xhg="1073" ybd="2391" yhg="2356" ID="I26.40.9">�http://www.mpr.es>. All declara- 
tions and notes issued by the Spanish First Vice-Presidency of the Government are avail- 
able at |··827 0 1 |.|·" typ="BWD2" xbd="780" xhg="344" ybd="2471" yhg="2437" ID="I26.42.3">�http://www.la-moncloa.es>. 
shared depending on the tonnes transported and this, of course, gives the 
responsibility for taking decisions mainly to those States with a flag of convenience. 
Today we have decided that what has already taken place is enough. As far as 
our two countries are concerned, in a way that is in perfect harmony with 
International Law, we have adopted this initiative and we ask our partners to 
do so too. As far as we are concerned, this decision is irrevocable".z3 
As the declarations made by the President of the Spanish Government at the press 
conference following the bilateral Spanish-French Summit reveal, the actions con- 
templated by France and Spain were directed only against a very particular kind 
of oil tanker, that is, "ships built more than 15 years ago, with a single hull, car- 
rying fuel or tar, not equipped with mechanisms for measuring the level and pres- 
sure of oil and representing a threat for our coasts". It is interesting to note that 
these actions were not directed only at vessels flying a flag of convenience (which 
in fact is what takes place in most of the cases), but against any vessel that meets 
the envisaged conditions, irrespective of the flag it flies. Unlike in the case of 
fisheries, in the case of doubtful oil tankers it is not the lack of control of the flag 
State that causes the environmental risk or threat, but the mere presence of these 
vessels within the exclusive economic zones. Hence, in the opinion of France and 
Spain, it is the need to avoid this environmental threat that justifies the expulsion 
of any oil tanker that meets these conditions from their exclusive economic zones. 
Spain and France immediately implemented the decision to expel this particu- 
lar kind of oil tanker from their exclusive economic zones. Spain expelled from 
its exclusive economic zone the following tankers: on 30 November 2002, the sin- 
gle hull oil tanker Moskowsky Festival, flying the flag of Malta;24 on 4 December, 
the oil tanker Evgueny Titov, also flying the flag of Malta;25 on 9 December, the 
oil tanker Teekay Foam, flying the flag of the Bahamas,;26 on 10 December, the oil 
2' Private translation. See Conferencia de prensa . . .  cit. 
24 "the President of the Government, Jose Maria Aznar, announced today that last night 
the first expulsion from Spanish terntorial waters of a vessel that did not comply with 
the conditions agreed with France after the oil spill of the Prestige took place. It is the 
Moskowsky, an oil tanker flying the flag of Malta, more than 15 years old, single hull, 
carrying fuel and whose destination was Gibraltar. The Spanish Government has recom- 
mended that the Portuguese authorities move it further away from the 200 miles from 
its coasts, as Spain has done following the bilateral agreement signed with France for 
the protection of the waters of the two countries against the transport of dangerous goods 
during the last bilateral summit at Malaga". Private translation. See the document 
Vicepresidencia Primera del Gobierno, (1 December 2002): El Gobierno informa. El 
barco Moskowsky, de bandera maltesa, fue expulsado de la zona econ6mica exclusiva 
espanola, 6 pp. 
25 see the document Vicepresidencia Primera del Gobierno, (4 December 2002): El Gobier- 
no informa. Nota 49. Mas de 8.200 toneladas recogidas ya en el mar, p. 1. 
26 See Ministerio de Defensa, (9 December 2002): Nota de prensa del Ministerio de 
tanker South Trader, flying the flag of Liberia;2' on 11 December, the oil tanker 
Byzantio, flying the flag of Malta;z8 on 18 December, the tanker Nestor C;z9 on 21 
December, the oil tanker Stmichaelis, flying the flag of Greece and, once again, 
the Moskowsky Festival;3° on 30 December the expulsion of other three oil tankers 
(the Majory, flying the flag of Malta; the Kriti Filoxenia, flying the flag of Greece; 
the Aquarius, flying the flag of Belize) was announced ;3 e tc .  France reacted in a 
similar way.32 Only one flag State affected by these measures, Greece, issued a 
diplomatic protest against these expulsions. 
Spain also succeeded in getting other European States (Portugal, Italy and Germany) 
associated with the Spanish-French decisions not to allow the navigation of sub- 
cont. 
Defensa: La Armada ha expulsado hoy de aguas espanolas al petrolero "Teekay Foam", 
1 p.; and Vicepresidencia Primera del Gobierno, (9 December 2002): El Gobierno 
informa. Nota 63. Espana expulsa de sus aguas a otro petrolero por no cumplir las nor- 
mas de seguridad, 6 pp. All the declarations and notes issued by the Spanish Ministry 
on Defence are available at |··823 0 1 |.|·" typ="BWD2" xbd="1120" xhg="684" ybd="1139" yhg="1104" ID="I28.16.6">�http://www.la-moncloa.es>. 
27 See the document Congreso de los Diputados, (10 December 2002): Comparecencia del 
Ministro de Fomento, Francisco Alvarez-Cascos, ante la Comision de Infraestructuras, 
p. 12. 
28 See the documents Xunta de Galicia. Oficina Informativa Comisi6n Seguimiento 
Prestige, (11 December 2002): Nota 68. Se amplia el Real Decreto de ayudas a los afec- 
tados a las Comunidades Aut6nomas de Asturias, Cantabria y Pais Vasco, 1 p.; and 
Vicepresidencia Primera del Gobierno, (13 December 2002): El Gobierno informa. Nota 
75. El Gobierno amplia las ayudas a Asturias, Cantabria y Pais Vasco, 4 pp. All the 
declarations and notes issued by the regional government of Galicia and by the Oficina 
Informativa de la Comision de Seguimiento del Prestige are available at �http://www. |··1120 0 1 |.|·" typ="DEC" xbd="390" xhg="239" ybd="1591" yhg="1569" ID="I28.27.1">xunta.es>. 
29 See Ministerio de Fomento, (19 December 2002): El Gobierno informa. Las Autoridades 
Maritimas espanolas prohiben la entrada del buque "Nestor C" en puerto espanol, 
2 pp. 
3o See Xunta De Galicia. Oficina Informativa Comisi6n Seguimiento Prestige, (21 
December 2002): Nota 95. Dn patrullero de la Armada impedird la entrada en aguas 
espanolas a dos bugues mercantes monocasco, 5 pp. 
" See the document Congreso De Los Diputados, (30 December 2002): Comparecencia del 
Ministro de Fomento, Francisco Alvarez-Cascos, ante la Comisi6n de Infraestructuras, 
cit. 
'2 For instance, "A destroyer from the French Navy navigates with the Enalios Titan, a sin- 
gle hull oil tanker, built in 1978 and carrying 81.185 tonnes of fuel oil in order to aban- 
don the French economic zone. Moreover, the French authorities have informed this 
tanker that, due to the agreements signed by France and Spain at Malaga, it cannot enter 
into the Spanish exclusive economic zone. If this tanker does not comply with this order 
and tries to enter into the Spanish exclusive economic zone, the frigate Baleares is ready 
to force it to retire from the Galician coasts". Private translation. See the documents 
Vicepresidencia Primera del Gobierno, (3 December 2002): El Gobierno informa. Nota 
47. Francia y Espana expulsan a un buque de bandera de Malta cargado con 81,185 
toneladas de fuel-oil, pp. 1-2; and Ministerio De Defensa, (4 December 2002): Nota de 
prensa del Ministerio de Defensa: Colaboracion de las Fuerzas Armadas en la protec- 
ci6n de la costa gallega, 2 p. 
standard oil tankers within the 200 mile limit.33 A "Joint Spanish-Italian Decla- 
ration concerning safety of transport in oil tankers", signed on 17 March 2003 by 
the Spanish Ministry on Transport and Public Works, Mr. Francisco .9lvarez- 
Cascos, and the Ministry on Infrastructures and Transport of the Italian Republic, 
Mr. Pietro Lunardi, stated that: 
"Both countries will help each other in the adoption of measures in conformity 
with the International Law of the Sea allowing to limit on a non discriminatory 
basis the traffic of vessels transporting dangerous and polluting goods within the 
200 mile limit from their coasts. This initiative pretends to reduce the risk and 
the consequences of an accident as much as, in average cases, to assist the ves- 
sel without danger for the environment, thanks to the remoteness from the 
coasts of those special transit routes. 
To this aim, Spain and Italy will establish a system of detailed information 
at the entrance of their exclusive economic zones in order to allow, in cases 
where doubts exist, an exhaustive control of the ship in the sea. Spain and Italy 
will ask the European Union to study the conditions for the generalization of 
these measures. ( . . .)  
The transport of heavy crude oil and fuel oil, as well as bitumen and tar will 
only be allowed in double hull oil tankers. Spain and Italy reaffirm their aim to 
ensure, initially through domestic measures, not to allow the entrance of single 
hull oil tankers carrying cargoes such as the afore-mentioned into their ports, 
anchorage and transfer places. Both States undertake to work for the quick 
adoption of these measures by the European Union and jointly or subsequently 
by the IMO".34 
'3 At the press conference held jointly by the President of the Council of Ministers of the 
Italian Republic, Mr. Silvio Berlusconi, and the President of the Spanish Government, 
Mr. Jose Maria Aznar, at the end of the bilateral Italian-Spanish Summit on 28 
November 2002, the Spanish President stated that: "President Berlusconi knows the let- 
ter that I have sent to the President of the (European) Commission and also to all my 
colleagues in the European Union. President Berlusconi has told me that he assumes the 
contents of this letter as his own and that, moreover, Italy is ready to accede to the 
agreement between France and Spain, agreement to which Portugal has acceded this 
morning in a conversation that I have held with the Portuguese Prime Minister". Private 
translation. See Conferencia de prensa del Presidente del Consejo de Ministros de la 
Republica Italiana, Silvio Berlusconi, y del Presidente del Gobierno, Don Jose Maria 
Aznar (28 November 2002). The Spanish text of this document is available at �http://www.la- |··823 0 1 |.|·" typ="DEC2" xbd="433" xhg="237" ybd="2302" yhg="2276" ID="I29.37.1">moncloa.es>. 
34 see the document Ministerio de Fomento, (17 March 2003): El Gobierno informa. El 
Ministro de Fomento y el Ministro de Infraestructuras y Transportes de Italia firman la 
"Declaraci6n Hispano-Italiana sobre la seguridad del transporte en buques tanques ", 4 
pp. This document is available at: |··823 0 1 |.|·" typ="DEC2" xbd="1143" xhg="787" ybd="2476" yhg="2443" ID="I29.41.7">�http://www.mfom.es>. 
3. Subsequent action promoted at the EU and the IMO 
As announced at the press conference closing the bilateral Summit of Malaga, 
France and Spain tried to give a larger scope to the bilaterally agreed measures, 
by seeking the support of the European Union (EU?5 and promoting their adop- 
tion by the competent instances of the International Maritime Organization (IMO). 
a) Regional measures: the case for the European Union 
On 21 November 2002, only eight days after the Prestige accident took place, the 
President of the Spanish Government wrote a letter to the President of the 
European Council, the President of the European Commission and to all Prime 
Ministers and Heads of State of the European Union proposing the urgent adop- 
tion of several measures in order to improve the safety of navigation.'6 The 
European Commission also reacted speedily and on 3 December 2002 adopted a 
Communication on improving safety at sea in response to the Prestige accident '31 
which recommended a series of measures for the further development and 
strengthening of the so called Erika I and Erika II packages.38 
Following these legal initiatives, the Council of Ministers on Transport, Tele- 
communications and Energy (the "Transport" Council) held at Brussels on 5-6 
35 At the press conference closing the bilateral Spanish-French Summit at Malaga, the President 
of the Spanish Government declared that: "As you know, I have written firstly to the 
President of the European Council, Mr. Rasmussen, and to the President of the European 
Commission, and in the same way I have written a letter to all the Prime Ministers and 
Heads of State of the European Union, proposing the urgent adoption of seven points 
concerning maritime safety: the establishment of the Maritime Safety Agency; the estab- 
lishment of a European compensation fund; the revision of the calendar for the intro- 
duction of the double hull for ships or an equivalent design for single hull oil tankers; 
a clear improvement on the inspection of vessels; to strengthen the mechanisms for the 
control of maritime traffic; the abolition inside the European Union of territories where 
no control is established that act as paradises; and the elaboration of new proposals in 
the field of International Maritime Law. As you also know, last Sunday, in the meeting 
I held with the President of the (European) Commission, Romano Prodi, the Commission 
backed these proposals fully". Private translation. See Conferencia de prensa del 
Presidente del Gobierno, Don Jose Maria Aznar, y del Presidente de la Repablica 
Francesa, Jacques Chirac (Malaga, 26 November 2002), 4 p. Cit. 
36 /bid. See also the document Congreso de los Diputados, (10 December 2002): Comparecencia 
del Ministro de Fomento, Francisco Alvarez-Cascos, ante la Comision de lnfraestruc- 
turas, p. 12. 
37 commission of the European Communities, document COM (2002) 681 final (Brussels, 
3.12.2002) : Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and to the 
Council on improving safety at sea in response to the Prestige accident, 27 pp. This doc- 
ument is also published in Bulletin of the European Union, 12-2002, point 1.4.72. All 
the European documents are available at |··1108 0 1 |.|·" typ="BWD2" xbd="1560" xhg="893" ybd="2354" yhg="2319" ID="I30.41.7">�http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/en/index.html>. 
'8 These EU legislative "packages" were adopted respectively on 21 March 2000 (Erika I) 
and 6 December 2000 (Erika II), in response to the accident of the oil tanker Erika on 
12 December 1999 on the Atlantic coast of France. 
December 2002, decided by unanimity of the Ministers from the 15 Member States 
to implement all the proposals contained in the letter from the President of the 
Spanish Government, Mr. Jose Maria Aznar. In particular, conclusions numbers 9 
and 11 o f  this "Transport" Council must be highlighted. They read as follows: 
"9. Agrees to reinforce mechanisms for the control of maritime traffic along the 
coasts of the Member States of the European Union through the establishment 
by the Member States, where appropriate and in accordance with international 
law, of a preventive distance for ships on which demonstrated irregularities 
have been established; 
I1. Invites Member States to adopt measures, in compliance with interna- 
tional law of the sea, which would permit coastal States to control and possibly 
to limit, in a non-discriminatory way, the traffic of vessels carrying dangerous 
and polluting goods, within 200 miles of their coastline, and invites the Commission 
to examine measures to limit the presence of single-hull tankers of more than 
15 years of age carrying heavy grades of oil within the exclusive economic 
zone of the Member States, or, where appropriate and in accordance with inter- 
national law, within 200 miles of their coastline".39 
The European Council of Copenhagen (12-13 December 2002) backed all these 
conclusions unanimously. The Presidency conclusions of this European Council 
stated the following: 
"The European Council expresses its regret and grave concerns with regard to 
the serious accident of the Prestige oil tanker off the north-west coast of Spain. 
The ensuing damage to the marine and socioeconomic environment and the 
threat to the livelihood of thousands of persons are intolerable. The European 
Union expresses its solidarity with the States, regions and populations that have 
been affected and its support and recognition of the efforts of the affected States, 
institutions and civil society towards the recovery of the polluted areas. 
The European Council recalls its conclusions in Nice in December 2000 con- 
cerning the Erika measures and acknowledges the determined efforts in the 
Euro-pean Community and the IMO since the Erika accident to enhance 
maritime safety and pollution prevention. The Union is determined to take all 
necessary measures to avoid a repetition of similar catastrophes and welcomes 
the rapid responses by the Council and the Commission. The Union will also 
continue to play a leading role in international efforts in pursuit of this objec- 
tive, in particular within the IMO. The conclusions of the Transport Council on 
39 See Document 15121/02 (Presse 380): Council of the European Union, 2472nd Council 
Meeting - Transport, Telecommunications and Energy - Brussels, 5-6 December 2002, 
p. 32. The "Environment" Council on 9 December 2002 also adopted all these same con- 
clusions. See Document 15101/02 (Presse 379), Council of the European Union: 2473rd 
meeting of the Council (Environment) held in Brussels on 9 December 2002, p. 22. 
6 December 2002 and the Environmental Council on 9 December 2002 should 
be implemented in all their aspects without delay".'0 
Implementing these conclusions, on 20 December 2002 the European Commission 
sent to the European Parliament and to the Council a new proposal amending Regulation 
(EC) No. 417/2002 of the European Parliament and the Council on the accelerated 
phasing-in of double hull or equivalent design requirements for single hull oil 
tankers and repealing Council Regulation (EC) No. 2978/94.11 The proposal con- 
tained three relevant amendments. First, considering that heavy oils are the most 
polluting type of oil and that in view of its relatively low commercial value and 
comparative small risk of fire or explosion they are regularly carried in older 
tankers nearing the end of their economic lives, the Regulation bans the transport 
of heavy o i l s  in single hull tankers bound for or leaving the ports of European 
Union Member States. Second, the Regulation sets out a speeded up timetable for 
the withdrawal of single hull oil tankers.'3 Third, the Regulation calls for the 
strengthening and implementation as soon as possible of the special inspection 
regime for oil tankers in order to assess the structural condition of single hull oil 
tankers over 15 years of age. In accordance with the new procedures envisaged, 
all single hull oil tankers, including the smaller ones that were initially left out of 
the equation, shall be submitted to the Condition Assessment Scheme (CAS).� The 
new Regulation was adopted on 22 July 2003 and entered into force on 21 
October 2003.'S 
The European Commission also adopted other initiatives concerning a Proposal 
for a Directive on ship-source pollution and on the introduction of sanctions, 
including criminal sanctions, for pollution offences on 5 March 2003'6 and a 
40 Conclusions of the European Council (Copenhagen, 12-13 December 2002), Bulletin of 
the European Union, 12-2002, Presidency conclusions, pars. 1.11.32-33. 
" The Commission Proposal was published as document COM(2002) 780 in the Bulletin 
of the European Union, 12-2002, point 1.4.78. 
42 The categories of heavy oil concerned are heavy fuel oil, heavy crude oil, waste oils, 
bitumen and tar. 
43 According to the new timetable, the cut-off date for operating Category 1 tankers moves 
from 2007 to 2005 with an age limit of 23 years; the proposed cut-off date for Category 
2 tankers is 2010 and an age limit of 28 years, in line with the US 1990 Oil Pollution 
Act; and for the Category 3 tankers the age limit is the same as for Category 2 tankers. 
44 The CAS is an additional reinforced inspection regime specially drawn up to detect the 
structural weakness of single hull oil tankers; pursuant to this proposal, all single hull 
oil tankers that do not satisfy the tests of this evaluation system, even if they are rela- 
tively recent, may not be allowed to enter into the ports of the European Union and fly 
the flag of a European Union Member State. 
as Regulation (EC) No. 1726/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 
July 2003 amending Regulation (EC) No. 417/2002 on the accelerated phasing-in of 
double-hull or equivalent design requirements for single-hull oil tankers is published in 
Official Journal L 249, of 1.10.2003, p. 1. 
46 See document COM(2003) 92 final 2003/0037(COD), (Brussels, 5.3.2003): Commission 
Proposal for a Council Framework Decision to strengthen the criminal-law frame- 
work for the enforcement of the law against ship-source pollution." Independently 
of the future adoption of these proposals, the European Commission has recog- 
nised that European interests need to be better defended and represented at the 
international level, making a very clear appeal for a necessary revision of UNCLOS: 
"Europe's coasts, in particular the Atlantic and the Mediterranean seaboards, 
are extremely vulnerable to the risks of major pollution incidents. The principle 
of freedom of the seas and impunity of the flag State still holds way in inter- 
national maritime transport. The Commission considers that robust maritime 
safety measures should be adopted at the international level, in the form of 
stricter navigation rules for ships carrying pollutant goods and more stringent 
controls on flag States. At the same time, a thorough study should be made of 
the extent to which international law, and in particular the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea dating from 1982, is suited to deal with the 
growing risks inherent in the carriage of pollutant substances by ships that are 
occasionally substandard. Civil society quite rightly appears to be increasingly 
less willing to accept the enormous economic and environmental costs of 
cont. 
of the European Communities, Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and 
of the Council on ship-source pollution and on the introduction of sanctions, including 
criminal sanctions, for pollution offences, 27 pp. This document has also been published 
in Bulletin of the European Union 3-2003, point 1.4.47. This proposal concerns two dif- 
ferent measures. First, the introduction into Community Law of international rules con- 
cerning pollution discharges from oil tankers and other vessels. It also provides for 
effective implementation mechanisms regulated in detail, including illegal discharges on 
the high seas. The second measure establishes that infringement of the rules concerning 
discharges (as set down by the 1973/78 MARPOL Convention, but also pollution result- 
ing from damage to the vessel), will be criminal infringements, and provides indications 
about the penalties to be imposed. These provisions apply to all persons, i.e. not just 
ship-owners but also the owner of the cargo, the classification society and any other per- 
son concerned by reason of grave negligence. The sanctions will probably often take the 
form of financial penalties, but where individuals are concerned they may include, in the 
most serious cases, imprisonment. These penalties will be appropriate, having a dissua- 
sive nature, and will be applied throughout the Community. They will also be justified 
and not insurable penalties. 
47 See the document COM(2003) 227 final, 2003/0088 (CNS), (Brussels, 2.5.2003): Commission 
of the European Communities, Proposal for a Council Framework Decision to 
strengthen the criminal-law framework for the enforcement of the law against ship- 
source pollution, 16 pp. This document has also been published in Bulletin of the 
European Union 5-2003, point 1.4.55. This proposal for a Framework Decision aims to 
strengthen the criminal-law measures, to approximate the provisions laid down by law 
or regulation in the Member States concerning ship-source pollution offences (in partic- 
ular, establishing common penalties and comparable procedural guarantees in the most 
serious cases of ship-source pollution) and to facilitate and encourage cooperation 
between Member States to repress these offences. 
pollution on the scale caused by the Erika and the Prestige in the name of free- 
dom of the seas, and the principles in question should therefore be re-examined 
with a view to better protecting the legitimate interests of coastal S t a t e s  
b) Multilateral measures: the case for the International Maritime Organization 
On 25 November 2002, at the opening meeting of the 89th Council of the IMO, 
the Permanent Spanish Representation made an important intervention on the 
Prestige accident that had taken place only 12 days before.'9 During this interven- 
tion, the Spanish Representative proposed a package of legal measures that should 
be adopted by the IMO "independently of what will be done at the European 
Community level". These measures were the following: 
"1. To move forward the traffic of vessels with dangerous goods from the cur- 
rent traffic separation scheme at Finisterre and from other maritime corridors. 
To this aim, Spain will immediately submit a proposal to this Organization; 
2. The need of the fastest implementation of an Audit Plan following the IMO 
model in order to audit flag States with a mandatory character, as was agreed 
with Spanish support at the last Meeting in Japan; 
3. To improve the inspection systems for vessels by the port State, i.e. reduc- 
ing the terms for inspection, introducing broadened mandatory inspections for 
vessels that have already shown deficiencies in previous inspections, improving 
the national mechanisms for the control of maritime traffic; 
4. A stricter requirement on the implementation of obligations by the classifi- 
cation societies concerning the minimum prescriptions provided for by the 
SOLAS Convention, that is, Assembly Resolutions A.739(18) and A.789(19); 
5. To control and require new responsibilities for the recognised organizations 
that act under the name of flag States; 
6. To implement the Guidelines on places of refuge without invading the sov- 
ereign powers of coastal States concerning the protection of their coasts and 
related interests, these places of refuge being designated depending on the cir- 
cumstances of each case, on the capacity of each coastal State to react in cases 
of emergency and on the guarantees given by the commercial interests on the 
ship and/or the cargo; 
'$ See European Commission, Directorate-General for Energy and Transport. Memo (21 
October 2003): Safer seas: the fight goes on, p. 7. 
a9 It must be recalled that, pursuant to Article 211.1 of UNCLOS, a "competent interna- 
tional organization" or a "general diplomatic conference" may establish international 
rules to prevent pollution of the marine environment from vessels. Moreover, these rules 
are not limited by any requirement concerning the "design, construction, manning or 
equipment of ships". Hence, it is not surprising that, after the Prestige accident, the 
affected coastal States, backed by all European Union Member States, strengthened their 
efforts to modify the international legal framework at the IMO. 
7. An urgent improvement of the international regime on compensation for 
damages resulting from oil pollution, with enough amounts and quick payments, 
including the contribution by the responsible persons of these traffics to provide 
coastal States with the means for combating in the most efficient way these cat- 
astrophes ; 
8. The elimination of transitional periods for the phasing-out of single hull oil 
tankers; 
9. To continue the IMO efforts to improve the training and living conditions on 
board; and 
10. The accelerated establishment of safety equipment on board of all vessels, 
such as automatic identification systems, voyage data recorders, etc."50 
On 27 February 2003, Spain submitted its proposal for a new traffic separation scheme, 
mandatory for all double hull oil tankers, off the coast of Galicia and 33-40 
marine miles distant from the coast. This proposal was discussed at the Sub- 
committee on Safety of Navigation (NAV 49) of the IMO at its meetings from 30 
June to 4 July 2003 and was approved by the Maritime Safety Committee in 2004. 
It must be noted that although UNCLOS does not expressly contemplate the adop- 
tion of traffic maritime schemes within the exclusive economic zone, this possibility 
is in conformity with its Article 211.1. 
Another Spanish legal initiative concerned the controversial issue of places and 
ports of refuge.5' Although the European Commission was already working on a 
proposal concerning Draft Guidelines for the establishment of places and ports of 
refuge for ships in distress, on 24 March 2003, last day for the submission of new 
proposals, no proposal was submitted to the IMO Subcommittees. Hence, Spain 
took the initiative and, on that date, presented two proposals in order to avoid a 
delay of one year in their adoption. The first Spanish proposal concerned the Guidelines 
for the establishment of places and ports of refuge for ships in distress. According 
50 Private translation. For the original Spanish text of these proposals, see the document 
Ministerio De Fomento, (25 November 2002): El Gobierno informa. Espana ha anunci- 
ado hoy en la OMI la inmediata propuesta de un dispositivo de tr6fico mas alejado de 
las costas para los buques con mercancias peligrosas, 4 pp. It is interesting to note that 
in this very same meeting, the Representations of Algeria, Bahamas, Belize, Denmark, 
France, Greece, India, Iceland, Morocco, Nigeria, Philippines and Portugal, announced 
their support for all or some of the Spanish proposals. 
51 The Protocol concerning cooperation in preventing pollution from ships and, in cases of 
emergency, combating pollution of the Mediterranean Sea (Valletta, 25 January 2002) 
refers to this issue in its Article 16, entitled "Reception of ships in distress in ports and 
places of refuge", which reads as follows: "The Parties shall define national, sub-regional 
or regional strategies concerning reception in places of refuge, including ports, of ships 
in distress presenting a threat to the marine environment. They shall cooperate to this 
end and inform the Regional Centre of the measures they have adopted". The text of 
this Protocol is available at |··827 0 1 |.|·" typ="DEC2" xbd="1093" xhg="670" ybd="2474" yhg="2439" ID="I35.42.6">�http://www.unepmap.org>. 
to this, Spain held that only those ships in distress complying with all the inter- 
national norms on safety of navigation, with all their data and operators clearly 
identified and offering an unlimited financial guarantee would be able to enter into 
places or ports of refuge. The second Spanish proposal concerned the auditing of 
flag States. Spain held that the audit model that the IMO had to elaborate must be 
mandatory for all flag States and that there must be public access to the results of 
any auditing.52 After consideration by the competent Committees of IMO, the Assembly 
of the Organization adopted on 5 December 2003 its Resolution A.949 (23) "Guidelines 
on places of refuge for ships in need of assistance",53 as well as its Resolution 
A.950 (23) "Maritime Assistance Services (MAS)".54 
In parallel with the adoption of European Regulation (EC) No. 1726/2003 of 
the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 July 2003 amending Regulation 
(EC) No. 417/2002 on the accelerated phasing-in of double-hull or equivalent 
design requirements for single-hull oil tankers, the 15 European Union Member 
States and the European Commission submitted to the IMO's Marine Environment 
Protection Committee a proposal for amending the 1973/78 MARPOL Convention 
in order to ensure that similar measures would apply worldwide. The European 
Union proposal was examined at the 49th session of the Marine Environment Protection 
Committee that met during the week from 14 to 18 July 2003. The majority of the 
delegations present accepted in principle the European Union recommendations 
concerning the accelerated withdrawal of single hull oil tankers, the reinforcement 
of the condition assessment scheme (CAS) and the banning of the carriage of 
heavy oils in single hull tankers. However, no final decision was taken and the 
negotiations on the final version of the amendments to the 1973/78 MARPOL 
Convention will continue in the IMO General Assembly during an extraordinary 
session of the Committee in December 2003. 
Additionally, implementing one of the conclusions of the European "Transport" 
Councils on 11 April 2003 six European Union Member States (Belgium, France, 
sz The Spanish texts of both proposals are annexed to the document Ministerio de 
Fomento, (27 March 2003): El Gobierno informa. El Ministerio de Fomento presenta 
MMewM propMMfa� a�te /a OM/ poM m6/o/'a/' /a M�MrMa� �MhH�TM, 15 pp. � nuevaspr puestasantel a O I ara ej r rl  seguridad mari t ima, p .  en et 
53 Doc. A/23 Res. 949, 5 March 2004. See Sanchez Ramos, B. "Nuevos avances en el 
acceso a lugares de refugio: las directrices sobre lugares de refugio para buques en peli- 
gro de la Organizacion Marftima Internacional", Revista Electronica de Estudios 
Intemacionales, 8, 2004, 15 p. (available at |··950 0 1 |)|··823 0 1 |.|·" typ="DEC2" xbd="1289" xhg="935" ybd="2142" yhg="2107" ID="I36.36.8">�http://www.reei.org>). 
d o c .  A/23 Res. 950, 5 March 2004. 
according  to Conclusion number 10, the Council "urges the Member States that have 
common interests in sensitive sea areas to identify and formulate coordinated proposals 
for the areas to be protected as Particular Sensitive Areas by IMO. Urges the IMO to 
develop the use of the instrument of designating Sensitive Sea Areas (SSA) and 
Particularly Sensitive Sea Areas (PSSA)". See Document 15121/02 (Presse 380): Council 
of the European Union, 2472nd Council Meeting - Transport, Telecommunications and 
Energy - Brussels, 5-6 December 2002, p. 32. 
Ireland, Portugal, Spain and United Kingdom), with the support of the European 
Commission, submitted a proposal to the IMO for the designation of a vast Particularly 
Sensitive Sea Area (PSSA) covering their Atlantic exclusive economic zones and 
corresponding to most of the European Union Atlantic area 56 Under this proposal, 
this marine area will enjoy special protection as a consequence of the introduction 
of restrictive measures (including expulsion) for the navigation of single hull oil 
tankers carrying heavy oils. A preliminary examination in the IMO in July 2003 
made it possible to give support to this proposal, which was approved "in princi- 
ple" at the 49th session of the Marine Environmental Protection Committee 
(MEPC) of IMO, pending approval of associated protective measures. Also, in October 
2003, Spain submitted a proposal for the designation of the waters of the Canary 
Islands as a PSSA,57 which was approved "in principle" by the plenary at MEPC 
51 ( 2 9  March-2 April 2004),5$ pending approval of the proposed protective mea- 
sures by the IMO Subcommittee on Safety of Navigation. 
Finally, it must be remembered that the only proposal made by the European 
Commission included in the "Erika I and II packages" that was not adopted as 
a Community norm consisted in raising the upper limits on the amounts payable 
as a compensation for the victims of oil spills from EUR 200 million to EUR 
one billion. The Council of Ministers decided to negotiate this very same pro- 
posal at the IMO in order to obtain a similar agreement worldwide. After the 
European Union Member States supported this proposal at the IMO on 9 May 
2003,59 the International Diplomatic Conference, convened at London from 12 to 
16 May 2003, succeeded in adopting a new Protocol to the International Con- 
vention on the Establishment of an International Fund for Compensation for Oil 
Pollution Damage, 1992.60 Although other different proposals were submitted and 
discussed,61 the firm attitude shown by the European Union Member States and the 
56 see the document Ministerio de Fomento (12 April 2003): El Gobierno informa. Espana 
presenta ante la OMI nuevas iniciativas para la protection del medio ambiente marino, 
2 pp. 
d o c .  MEPC 51/8, 24 October 2003. 
sg In addition to the Canary Islands PSSA, MEPC 51 also approved "in principle" PSSAs 
for the Baltic Sea and the Galapagos Archipelago, with the opposition of the Russian 
Federation, Liberia and Panama. 
s9 See the document Ministerio de Fomento, (3 May 2003): El Gobierno informa. Espana 
propondrd la ampliacion del fondo para danos por hidrocarburos a 1.000 millones de 
euros, 2 pp. 
60 See the 2003 Draft Protocol to the International Convention on the Establishment of an 
International Fund for Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage, 1992 Doc. LEG/ 
CONF.14/DC/2, 16 May 2003; see also the document Ministerio de Fomento, ( 16 May 
2003): El Gobierno informa. La OMI acepta la propuesta del Ministerio de Fomento. 
La indemnizaci6n por danos debidos a la contaminacion por hidrocarburos alcanzarl! 
los 1,000 millones de euros, 4 pp. 
6' For instance, Japan presented a proposal to increase the compensation fund up to EUR 
500 million. 
European Commission 62 resulted in the adoption of a new Protocol to the 1971 
Fund Convention, establishing a new supplementary fund with 750 million 
DTS/SDR (just over USD 1152 million), that is almost the amount originally pro- 
posed by the European Union Member States. Following ratification by Spain on 
Friday 3 December 2004, the required number of contracting Parties for the enter- 
ing into force of the 2003 Protocol establishing an International Oil Pollution 
Compensation Supplementary Fund was completed, and the new IOPC Supplementary 
Fund came into existence on 3 March 2005, three months after the date of Spain's 
ratification. 
4. New Spanish legislation concerning vessel traffic monitoring and 
information 
In pursuance of European Union Directive 2002/59/EC of the European Parliament 
and of the Council of 27 June 2002, establishing a Community vessel traffic mon- 
itoring and information system and repealing Council Directive 93/75/EEC, Spain 
adopted Royal Decree 210/2004, of 6 February, establishing a system of moni- 
toring and information concerning maritime traffic.63 Previous implementation of 
Directive 2002/59/EC was partially accomplished by Spanish Act 62/2003, of 30 
December, on fiscal, administrative and social measures, whose Article 108 deals 
with authorizations to enter into places or ports of refuge. Now, Royal Decree 210/2004 
completes the transposition of the EU Directive by providing for a more compre- 
hensive and integrated system of vessel traffic monitoring and information. 
According to the provisions in Chapter I, this Royal Decree aims at increasing 
maritime safety, improving the ability of the maritime administration to respond to 
potentially dangerous situations and better prevent pollution by ships.64 It applies 
to merchant ships over 300 GRT, although its provisions concerning response to 
accidents and places of refuge (Articles 17-25) also apply to fishing, historical and 
recreational crafts 
Chapter II of the Royal Decree requires prior notification of the information 
specified in Annex I by all vessels bound for a Spanish port and subsequent mon- 
itoring of their compliance with vessel traffic services (VTS) established in execu- 
62 The European Commission had held that: "In the context of the 1990 Oil Pollution Act, 
the USA set up their own arrangement, comprising a compensation fund of $ 1 billion, 
and decided not to get involved in the international arrangement. In the event of the fail- 
ure of its proposals at international level, it is clear that, like the USA, the European 
Union will have to address the question of whether or not it will stay within the FIPOL 
regime". See European Commission, Directorate-General for Energy and Transport. 
Memo (21 October 2003): Safer seas: the fight goes on, p. 7. 
63 BOE of 14 February 2004. 
64 Art. 1. 
ss Art. 2. 
tion of, or with due consideration for, the relevant IMO rules.66 Compliance with 
vessel traffic organization services is mandatory for all ships in the territorial sea, 
for ships flying an EU Member State flag or with destination to an EU port in 
other Spanish waters beyond the territorial sea and, "whenever it is possible", also 
for ships flying the flag of non EU Member States or not bound for EU ports.67 
Ships calling into Spanish ports shall be equipped with an Automatic Identification 
System (AIS) and a Voyage Data Record (VDR) S y s t e m  
In accordance with Chapter III, all ships carrying dangerous or polluting goods 
shall notify all relevant information specified in Annex I to the competent mar- 
itime authorities before loading in a Spanish port, or leaving from a Spanish port, 
or when the ship is bound for a Spanish port. The duty to notify affects the owner, 
the operator, the agent and the Captain. The Spanish Director General of Merchant 
Shipping can exempt its application with respect to coasting trade. 
Chapter IV deals with monitoring of dangerous ships and intervention in case 
of problems or accidents at sea. It identifies as "potentially dangerous" ships all 
vessels having one of the following characteristics: ships involved in incidents or 
accidents at sea; ships not complying with mandatory notification or information 
provisions; ships having realized voluntary releases of oil or other violations of 
MARPOL; and ships whose access to an EU port has been denied. The presence 
of these ships in Spanish waters shall be notified to the Spanish administrative 
maritime authorities and to coastal stations of other EU Member States concerned. 
The Spanish maritime administration shall undertake convenient "inspections or 
verifications" with respect to those ships and inform all interested EU Member States.69 
Any "incident or accident" (including "situations" susceptible of producing pol- 
lution of an EU coastal Member State and "spots" of polluting substances, con- 
tainers or bulk) shall be immediately notified to coastal stations. In such a case the 
Spanish maritime administration can adopt inter alia any of the following mea- 
sures : a) imposing a given route on the ship; b) giving the Captain a term for 
putting an end to the risk; c) placing on board a team responsible for assessment 
of risks, assistance to the Master and information to coastal stations; and d) order- 
ing the Captain to direct the ship to a place of refuge." 
With respect to this latter option, the Royal Decree calls for the elaboration of 
plans, accessible at the request of interested parties, aimed at bringing ships in 
need of assistance into waters under Spanish jurisdiction. Authorization for a 
requesting ship to enter into a given place of refuge, which is not mandatory for 
the coastal State, shall be granted when the Administration decides, in view of the 
66 Namely, rules 10 and 11 o f  Chapter V of SOLAS. 
67 Art. 8. 
A r t s .  6 and 10, respectively. 
69 Art. 16. 
'° Art. 19. 
relevant information and other elements available, that the foreseeable resulting 
damage would be inferior to other alternative measures of assistance; if such is not 
the case, the authorization shall be denied, in a motivated decision, by the Spanish 
Maritime Administration. In weighing the elements for its decision, acting on a 
case by case basis, the competent maritime authority shall apply the specific cri- 
teria listed in Article 21 of the Royal Decree, which follows those contained in the 
IMO guidelines on places of refuge for ships in need of assistance [Resolution 
A/949 (23)]. The criteria for objective analysis, listed in Article 21 shall be fur- 
ther developed by subsequent more detailed regulatory procedures.71 However, the 
authorization to enter into a place of refuge shall be contingent upon the constitu- 
tion of a financial guarantee for ships carrying particularly dangerous substances.72 
The decision-making process shall start at the request of the ship's Captain or 
a representative of the shipping company, who shall indicate the reasons support- 
ing its request for a place of refuge. The decision as to granting or not the permit 
requested is taken by the Director General of Merchant Shipping, who may dele- 
gate in the Maritime Captain of the circumscription in which the ship is located.'3 
Although Spain is one of the few Member States that has already transposed 
into domestic law European Directive 2002/59/EC on places of refuge, criticism 
against the high amount of the financial guarantees required by this Royal Decree 
has been voiced from ship-owners and salvers seeking a safe haven for a casualty 
along the Spanish coastline.74 
II .  L I A B I L I T Y ,  R E S P O N S I B I L I T Y  A N D  C O M P E N S A T I O N  
F O R  D A M A G E S  
The extraordinarily damaging consequences of the oil spill caused by the Prestige 
have given rise to a difficult scenario with respect to issues of liability, responsi- 
bility and compensation for damages. As in precedent occasions, criminal pro- 
ceedings have been instituted against different persons before the competent 
Spanish Court in Corcubion (La Coruna, Spain). Whatever may be the reasons for 
it, the criminal nature of the judicial proceedings does not help to facilitate the 
application of the existing legal regimes on civil liability and compensation for 
damages. We shall try to summarize the main elements of the complex questions 
raised in this respect, as they have developed in practice. 
71 The fifth additional provision of the Royal Decree states that: "within a two year delay 
the Maritime Administration will adapt existing plans and procedures on places of refuge 
to the IMO guidelines". 
'2 Arts. 22 and 23. 
73 Art. 24. 
74 See: Lloyd's List, 18 February 2004 (n. 58598) p. 3; 20 February 2004 (n. 58600) p. 7; 
15 April 2004 (n. 58639) p. 14. 
1. Criminal prosecution of the Captain 
The Captain of the ship, Apostolos Mangouras, was arrested on 15 November 
2002 and indicted with charges of crimes against natural resources and the envi- 
ronment (Arts. 325 and following of the Spanish Criminal Code) and disobedience 
to the competent Authority. On 17 November 2002 the Instruction Court number 
4 of La Coruna rendered an Order of provisional imprisonment against the 
Captain, with bail of 3 million, which was confirmed by the Provincial Criminal 
Court of La Coruna (3rd Section) on 3 January 2003. The implementation of the 
judicial Order of provisional imprisonment against the Captain of the ship and the 
quite severe accompanying conditions, raised some criticisms. 
The criminal indictment of the Master of the Prestige is based on the assump- 
tion that the relevant provisions in Articles 73 (more related to violation of 
fisheries laws and regulations), 226 and 230 of UNCLOS do not preclude his pros- 
ecution for disobedience to Spanish authorities and environmental crime, for two 
different reasons. First, Article 230 provides that "monetary penalties only" may be 
imposed with respect to violations of applicable national and international law for 
the prevention, reduction and control of pollution committed by foreign vessels beyond 
the territorial sea or in the territorial sea, "except in the cases of a wilful and seri- 
ous act of pollution in the territorial s e a s  In the conduct of proceedings in 
respect of such violations committed by a foreign vessel which may result in the 
imposition of penalties, recognized rights of the accused shall be observed". 
Actually, Captain Mangouras committed the alleged violations both beyond and 
within the territorial sea, thus producing an (arguably) wilful and serious act of 
pollution in the territorial sea and the Spanish coast. Second, disobedience to 
authorities and ecological crime are separate charges not covered under Article 230 
of UNCLOS, which refers only to violations of national laws or applicable inter- 
national rules and standards "for the prevention, reduction and control of pollu- 
tion". Arguably, this was not the case with respect to Captain Mangouras; at the 
time of the commission of the alleged crimes he was not exercising normal free- 
dom of navigation or innocent passage, but mastering a vessel affected by a "casu- 
alty", under the authority of the coastal State (Article 221). The crimes allegedly 
committed by him do not relate to violations of ordinary rules for the prevention, 
reduction and control of pollution, but rather to violations of orders of the com- 
petent Governmental Authorities in view of avoiding an ecological catastrophe. 
Thus, by disobeying these orders, he allegedly might have contributed to originat- 
ing such an unwanted result. 
'S Art. 230 of UNCLOS, entitled "Monetary penalties and the observance of recognized 
rights of the accused", reads as follows: 
"1. Monetary penalties only may be imposed with respect to violations of national laws 
and regulations or applicable international rules and standards for the prevention, 
reduction and control of pollution of the marine environment, committed by foreign 
vessels beyond the territorial sea. 
On the other hand, the severe economic and personal conditions of the bail 
imposed on the Captain have given rise to persistent objections. In the view of the 
Spanish Courts, the unusually high amount of the bail is justified by the extraor- 
dinary foreseeable amount of the damages caused by the Prestige, as well as 
linked to the fact that, in Spanish criminal law, the person guilty of a crime bears 
the civil liability for damages resulting from its criminal conduct (Criminal Code, 
Article 2). However, after several appeals to review the 3 million bail had been 
rejected, the lawyers acting for the Captain filed a case before the European Court 
of Human Rights, in a bid to have his strict bail conditions cased.'6 Other an- 
nounced claims concerning the "excessive" amount of the bail and the severe 
restrictions of the freedom of movements imposed on the Captain have not 
resulted in a formal application before the International Tribunal for the Law of 
the Sea (UNCLOS, Annex VI). In this latter case, it seems also doubtful whether 
the provisions concerning prompt release of vessels and crews of UNCLOS 
(Article 292), would have granted the exercise of jurisdiction by ITLOS in the 
matter.77 
Be as it may, after the failure of the judicial appeals filed by the Master's 
lawyers to relax the bail conditions imposed on him, the Greek Ambassador in 
Spain notified the Court, on 10 August 2004, of the pledge of its Government to 
secure the implementation of the obligations of Captain Mangouras. As a result, 
by an Order issued on 15 November 2004, the Court in Corcubion, while not 
accepting a reduction of the amount of the bail imposed, allowed the Captain to 
travel to Greece and await judgement there. 
2. Financial assistance to victims and advance payments of compensations 
At the time of the accident, Spain was a Contracting Party to most IMO Con- 
ventions concerning marine safety, including both the International Convention 
cont. 
2. Monetary penalties only may be imposed with respect to violations of national laws 
and regulations or applicable international rules and standards for the prevention, 
reduction and control of pollution of the marine environment, committed by foreign 
vessels in the territorial sea, except in the case of a wilful and serious act of pollu- 
tion in the territorial sea. 
3. In the conduct of proceedings in respect of such violations committed by a foreign 
vessel which may result in the imposition of penalties, recognized rights of the 
accused shall be observed". 
16 Lloyd's List, 29 March 2004 (No. 58626), p. 1, and 2 April 2004 (No. 58630), p. 7. 
" Art. 292 of UNCLOS should be read in connection both with Art. 73.2, concerning the 
exercise of the coastal States' sovereign rights over living resources in the EEZ, and Art. 
226.1 b), applicable to the present case, which reads as follows: "If the investigation 
indicates a violation of applicable laws and regulations or international rules and stan- 
dards for the protection and preservation of the marine environment, release shall be 
made promptly subject to reasonable procedures such as bonding or other appropriate 
financial security". 
on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage 1969 (and its Protocols of 1976 and 
1992) and the International Convention on the Establishment of an International 
Fund for Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage 1971 (and its Protocols of 1976 
and 1992). 
Immediately after the accident, Spain adopted a series of legislative measures 
oriented at reducing the economic and social consequences of the accident. Royal 
Decree-Act 7/2002, of 22 November, concerning compensatory measures regard- 
ing the Prestige accident, provided for a series of promotional measures for imme- 
diate financial assistance consisting in: payment of 40 per day to all those directly 
affected by the fishing bans; a 100% waiver of Social Security payments and tax 
relief exemptions in the fishing, shell harvesting and aquaculture sectors. A series 
of preferential lines of credit, totalling 100 mi l l ion  were also made available to 
affected individuals and companies through the State controlled Spanish Official Credit 
Institute. On 13 December 2002, Spain passed a new Royal Decree-Act 8/2002, 
extending the above measures to the affected sectors in Asturias, Cantabria and the 
Basque Country and expanding their application to other sectors with a high 
dependence on the closed fisheries, such as fish vendors, fishing net repairers, and 
employees of fishing co-operatives, fish markets and ice factories. In addition, 
Spain approved Order APU/3289/2002, of 23 December, establishing procedures 
for the granting of financial aids aimed at restoring damages to public installations 
caused by the accident. 
However, in the light of the foreseeable length of the proceedings on compen- 
sation for damages under the CLC and FUND Conventions 1992 and its inherent 
quantitative limitations (171,5 million whereas estimated damages could rise above 
1.000 million),'9 the Spanish Government introduced a new mechanism to fully 
compensate the victims of the pollution. It is relevant to note in this respect, that 
unlike in previous cases the Prestige insurer (the London Club) decided not to 
make individual compensation payments up to the ship-owner's limitation amount. 
The decision was allegedly adopted following legal advice that if the Club were to 
make payments to claimants in line with past practice, it was likely that those pay- 
ments would not be taken into account by the Spanish Courts when the ship-owner 
set up the limitation fund, with the result that the Club could end up paying twice 
the limitation amount. However, after several meetings between lawyers of both 
parties, on 28 May 2003 the ship-owner deposited 22,771,986 before the Criminal 
Court in Corcubion for the purpose of constituting the limitation fund.10 
'8 See Doc. 92/FUND/EXC.22/8, 7 October 2003, par. 8,3. 
'9 Approximately 23.5 million compensation is available from the ship-owner's liability insurer 
(the London P�I Club). Additional compensation of up to approximately 148 million is 
available from the 1992 Fund. In other words, a total of 171.5 million is available. As 
estimated at the Executive Committee's May 2004 session, this available sum will be 
distributed to compensate victims of pollution, in Spain (834.8 million), France (176 mil- 
lion) and Portugal (3.3 million). 
$° See Doc. 92/FUND/EXC.22/8, 7 October 2003, par. 9. 
On the other hand, at its May 2003 session the Executive Committee decided 
that the 1992 Fund's payments should for the time being be limited to 15% of the 
loss or damage actually suffered by the respective claimants as assessed by the 
experts engaged by the London Club and the Fund. In spite of the deep concern 
expressed by both the Spanish and French delegations at the IOPC, the Executive 
Committee maintained the 15% limitation level of payments, the lowest in the 
Fund's history, at its October 2004 session in view of the remaining uncertainties 
as to the level of admissible claims. 
Confronted with that situation, an innovative regime was established by Royal 
Decree-Act 4/2003, of 30 June, regarding payment of compensation for damages 
caused by the accident of the vessel Prestige, and subsequent regulations contained 
in Royal Decree 1053/2003, of 1 August. The overriding aim of the system is to 
provide rapid compensation for damages and save the victims from protracted processes 
of recognising their rights to compensation. The system for advance compensation 
is applicable to individuals or legal entities,8' be they Spanish or not, who have 
incurred damages in Spain as a result of the accident of the Prestige, and not to 
those affected in other countries. The system will only apply to those victims who 
expressly state their will to adhere to it by subscribing a transactional agreement 
with the Spanish Government destined to the payment of an amount in compen- 
sation for the damages incurred as a result of pollution. The initial limit of the 
sum available for the payment of indemnities, for claims submitted before 31 December 
2003, was 160 million, but a new Royal Decree-Act 4/2004, of 3 July, increased 
the funds available for compensation to 249.5 million. In addition, the Decree extended 
the period in which victims could claim for losses suffered directly as a result 
of the incident to include 2004. The funds available for compensation of losses 
occurring during 2004 were limited by the Decree to 3 million and claimants were 
required to submit claims by 31 March 2005. 
The celebration of each individual agreement implies:82 
a) That the victim has the right to receive from the Spanish Government the 
stipulated amount as compensation. 
b) That the victim thereby declares all claims to be satisfied, and thus re- 
nounces any national or international claims outstanding. 
c) That the Spanish Government thereby assumes any rights or actions that 
may correspond to the victims who subscribed the agreement. 
11 Public bodies other than the Spanish Government (i.e. Governments of Autonomous Regions, 
municipalities and local authorities) can also adhere to the advance compensation sys- 
tem, by subscribing Agreements of Collaboration with the Spanish Government, which 
in such case will also subrogate in all rights and actions for compensation that may cor- 
respond to these bodies as a result of the disaster. 
82 See Vazquez Guill6n, A., "Prestige and the Law: Regulations and compensations", l7th 
Annual Oil Pollution Conference (London 15-16 March 2004), Lloyd's List Events, 
2004. 
d) That the fact of subscribing this agreement in no way supposes the recogni- 
tion of responsibility by the Spanish Government. 
The sum paid in compensation to each claimant is to be determined according to 
the damages actually incurred, following the same assessment criteria used by the 
1992 CLC and Fund Conventions. All payments will be channelled through a 
single public financial institution, the Official Credit Institute (Instituto de Credito 
Oficial, ICO). The Spanish Government will subsequently take all legal and extra 
legal actions necessary, both in Spain and abroad, to obtain compensation for dam- 
ages directly incurred by the State (costs and expenses of clean up operations, 
compensation payments to fishermen and shellfish harvesters, tax relief for busi- 
nesses affected by the spill, administration costs and costs relating to publicity 
campaigns). It will also take the same actions with respect to the recovery of dam- 
ages arising from the compensation to other public and private persons to whom 
the State subrogates as a result of transactional agreements made in application of 
Royal Decree-Act 4/2003 and Royal Decree-Act 4/2004.83 The question as to 
whether this subrogation also applies to future damages appearing after the 
advance payoff is made has been considered and eventually rejected by legal doctrine. 84 
In implementing the above-summarized system, the Spanish delegation at the 
Fund Executive Committee session in October 2003 proposed that the Fund 
should, subject to certain safeguards, make advance payments on account of the 
final amount that will eventually correspond to Spain. The matter was referred to 
the IMO Assembly which authorized the IOPC Fund Director to make a payment 
of 15% of the amount of the claims submitted, subject to the Spanish Govern- 
ment providing a guarantee from a financial institution, not from the Spanish State, 
having the financial standing required by the 1992 Fund's Internal Investment 
Guidelines. On that basis, as authorized by the Assembly, an advance payment 
fixed at a total sum of 57.5 million, was granted at the IOPC Fund Executive Com- 
mittee session in October 2003, on the basis of the initial study of the invoices 
already presented by the Spanish Government and the overall assessment of 
the total admissible damages for Spain.85 The whole of this advance sum, which 
g3 The subrogation by the Spanish authorities in those claims is made pursuant to Art. 9.3 
of the 1992 Fund Convention: "Without prejudice to any other rights of subrogation or 
recourse against the Fund which may exist, a Contracting State or agency thereof which 
has paid compensation for pollution damage in accordance with provisions of national 
law shall acquire by subrogation the rights that the person so compensated would have 
enjoyed under this Convention". 
84 See: Meilan Gil, J. L., (Director), Problemas juridico-administrativos planteados por el 
Prestige, Thomson-Aranzadi, 2005. 
85 The first claim received from the Spanish Government had been assessed by the Director 
on an interim basis at 107 million and a payment of 16,050,000, corresponding to 15% 
of the assessed amount, had been made in December 2003. The Director had made a 
general assessment of the total of the admissible damage in Spain at 303 million and, 
was transferred to the Spanish Government on 17 December 2003 against a Bank 
guarantee from ICO and an undertaking by the Spanish Government to repay it if 
the Executive Committee so decided, was made available by the Spanish authori- 
ties for the payment of compensation to the victims. 
By February 2004 the Spanish Government had received almost 29,000 claims 
for compensation, most of them related to workers in the fisheries sector, from vic- 
tims of the Prestige accident who wished to use the payment mechanism set out 
in the Royal Decree-Acts. On 18 February 2004, 15 months after the accident, in 
execution of agreements passed by the Government with affected claimants, 
approximately 12,000 victims in the fisheries sector had already received compen- 
sation, for a total sum of 51 million. In August 2004, agreements were reached 
with the great majority of the workers in that sector and payments totalling 71 mil- 
lion were made to them under the Royal Law-Decrees.86 
In July 2004 the Spanish Government submitted a request to the Court in Corcubion 
for the release to it of the 22,777,986 deposited with the Court by the ship-owner 
for the purpose of constituting the limitation fund. In its request, the Spanish 
Government argued that the Court should release this amount to it, since it was 
paying compensation to the victims of the spill. The 1992 Fund and other parties 
in the legal proceedings before the Court in Corcubion submitted pleadings oppos- 
ing this request and in July 2004 the Court rejected the Spanish Government's 
request on procedural grounds. The Spanish Government appealed against this 
decision but on 4 October 2004 the appeal was withdrawn. 
So, at the end of 2004, Spain had only received an advance sum of 57.5 mil- 
lion from the 1992 Fund whereas costs incurred by the Government in response 
to the damages resulting from the accident amount to not less than 1,000 million. 
3. Court actions in Spain and abroad 
Given that the foreseeable amounts of compensations to be covered by the CLC 
and IOPC Fund regimes (171.5 million) lie far below the actual amount of claims 
submitted by public and private victims in Spain,87 several initiatives have been 
cont. 
as authorised by the Assembly, in December 2003 he had also made a further payment 
of 41,505,000 against a bank guarantee provided by a Spanish bank, bringing the total 
amount paid by the 1992 Fund to the Spanish Government to 57,555,000. 
$6 The remaining claims formulated by 3.638 persons under the Decrees would be subject 
to individual assessments by the Consorcio de Compensaci6n de Seguros, a State-owned 
insurance organization set up to pay claims for damage not normally covered by com- 
mercial insurance policies, such as damage due to terrorist activity or natural disasters. 
As at May 2005, payments made to 19,500 workers of the fisheries sector amounted to 
some 88 million (see: Doc. 92/FUND/EXC.29/4, 9 June 2005, par. 5.6). 
87 claims for damages incurred in Spain were estimated at the Executive Committee's May 
2004 session at 834.8 million. 
made in order to pursue legal actions against other possible responsible individu- 
als or legal persons involved with the Prestige accident. Some 2020 claimants 
have joined the legal proceedings before the criminal Court in Corcubion, of 
whom 208 have also submitted claims to the IOPC Fund's Claims Handling Office 
in La Coruna. It is expected that some of these claimants who had settled with the 
Spanish Government under the Royal Decrees will withdraw their claims from 
court proceedings.88 
In addition to the criminal prosecution of the Captain of the Prestige, in 2003 
the Court in Corcubion also accepted the criminal indictment of the Spanish 
Director General of Merchant Shipping, Jose Luis Lopez Sors, on charges of reck- 
less conduct. If successful, this indictment might have important consequences not 
only for the concerned person, but also for the Spanish State which, on a sub- 
sidiary basis, will bear the civil liability resulting from his criminal offence. The 
Court in Corcubion also admitted the imputation of the Greek citizen Michael Magretis, 
as manager of the operator of the ship, the Greek established Liberian corpora- 
tion Universe Maritime Ltd, however Mr. Magretis regretfully died soon after his 
indictment. 
On the other hand, in May 2005 the Criminal Court in Corcubion, in its role 
of investigating the cause of the incident and potential liabilities, following a 
request by the Public Prosecutor, had declared that the ship-owner might be 
directly liable for the damage caused by the incident. In its decision the Court held 
that, under Spanish law, any person who had incurred in criminal liability also has 
civil liability for the damage arising from the criminal action. In the Court's deci- 
sion it was stated that the Master of the Prestige, who had had the control and 
had commanded the ship, might have criminal liability arising from the event and 
that the ship-owner might be directly liable for the damage caused. Once the 
investigation had been concluded, the Court file would be passed on to a Criminal 
Court judge who would render a judgement on the criminal and civil liabilities 
arising out of the incident. The Court, taking into account that the Spanish Govern- 
ment had paid compensation to victims as a result of the incident for 87,774,614.59, 
had ordered the ship-owner to provide the Court security in that amount in addition 
to the limitation amount applicable to the Prestige, which the ship-owner had deposited 
with the limitation Court.89 
However, as this Court decision raised criticisms by the Director and several 
delegations at the June 2005 session of the Fund's Executive Committees,90 the 
Court in Corcubi6n moved to link the liability of Universe Maritime Ltd to the 
prosecution of the Captain, in view of the "contractual relationship" existing 
gg See Doc. 92/FUND/EXC.29/4, 9 June 2005, par. 11.1. 
89 See Doc. 92/FUND/EXC.29/6, 28 June 2005, par. 3.2.29-3.2.30. 
�° See Doc. 92/FUND/EXC.29/6, 28 June 2005, par. 3.2.31-3.2.35. 
between the operator company and the said Captain. Thus, on 5 July 2005, the 
Court of Corcubion ordered the operator Universe Maritime to attach 87.7 million 
to cover the sum already paid by the Spanish Administration to the victims of the 
accident.91 
The question may be raised as to how those judicial proceedings are compa- 
tible with the provisions of the CLC, channelling the liability for any pollution 
damage caused by the ship as a result of an accident exclusively to the owner of 
the ship.9z In answering that question, it should be kept in mind that Article III, 
paragraph 4, of the CLC affirms that "no claim for compensation for pollution 
damage may be made" against the owner and other expressly excluded persons 
(including the operator of the ship), "unless the damage resulted from their 
personal act or omission, committed with the intent to cause such damage, or 
recklessly and with knowledge that such damage would probably result". One per- 
missible reading of this provision is that it does not preclude the competent 
national Court to entertain criminal or civil actions against individuals or legal per- 
sons listed in Article III, paragraph 4 of the 1992 CLC, either for wilful acts or 
omissions or reckless conduct resulting in pollution damages. In any case, the pro- 
vision under consideration does not prevent the competent national Court to enter- 
tain civil liability or criminal claims against any other individuals or legal persons 
not expressly excluded by Article III, paragraph 4, of the 1992 CLC.93 Moreover, 
damaged parties could eventually seek compensation against any liable parties 
before the Courts of a third State not being a party to the CLC and Fund 
Conventions. 
Under these assumptions, both the Kingdom of Spain and certain constituents 
of the Basque Country (Comunidad Autonoma del Pais Vasco et al.) have brought 
claims against other possible holders of legal responsibilities or liabilities before 
the Courts of the United States of America. The rationale of these legal actions 
stands on the assumption that the application of the objective civil liability regime 
91 El Pais, 6 July 2005. 
9z ln June 2005, at the 29th session of the Executive Committee, "The Director stated that 
the investigating Criminal Court had appeared to have based its decision on Spanish 
criminal law without taking into account the relevant provisions of the 1992 Civil 
Liability Convention, which formed part of Spanish law. He drew attention to the fact 
that Article IIL4 of the 1992 Civil Liability Convention prohibited claims for compen- 
sation against the ship-owner otherwise than in accordance with the Convention and also 
prohibited (other than in certain circumstances set out in the Convention) claims for 
compensation for pollution damage, under the Convention or otherwise, against the 
members of the crew or the charterer, manager and operator of the ship. The Director 
expressed the view that the decision by the Court did not respect these provisions. He 
stated that the Fund was not party to these proceedings and could not appeal against the 
decision". Doc. 92/FUND/EXC.29/6, 28 June 2005, par. 3.2.31. 
93 For instance, the classification society. See Camarda, G. "Natura e responsabilita delle 
societa di classificazione delle navi", in Mare, porti e reti infrastrutturali: per una nuova 
politica dei transporti", Messina, 2002, pp. 339-374. 
provided for by the CLC and Fund Conventions does not preclude the introduc- 
tion of separate tort actions based on fault or negligence against other responsible 
physical or legal persons involved in the accident of the oil tanker Prestige. The 
judicial claims introduced affect, in a first step, the classification company acting in 
the case of the Prestige, that is, the US Corporation American Bureau of Shipping 
Inc. (ABS). 
The Government of the Basque Country has sued ABS before the United States 
District Court for the Southern District of Texas. The lawsuit introduced by the 
Basque Government before the US Federal Court in Houston charges ABS with 
negligence and gross negligence, alleging that it breached its duty of care "by fail- 
ing to perform an adequate inspection of the Prestige, and by classifying it as sea- 
worthy, when the vessel simply was not".9° The Texas action was later transferred 
to the United States Federal Court of New York where it is pending as Comunidad 
Autonoma del Pais Vasco et al. v. ABS.9s 
The Kingdom of Spain is also pursuing legal actions before the same United 
States Federal Court of New York, on its own behalf and as a trustee, against the 
involved US Classification Corporation (American Bureau of Shipping Inc. ABS). 
In its complaint, the Plaintiff State alleges that ABS was negligent in classifying 
the Prestige as fit to carry fuel cargo. In particular the plaintiff claims that, 
although the vessel was listed in the "ABS Record" and it issued documents cer- 
tifying its classification, structural details of the Prestige did not satisfy relevant 
ABS fatigue and other requirements for steel vessels96 and that the ABS surveyor 
failed to comply with the ballast tank requirement in effect at the time of the May 
2002 annual survey of the ship.9' 
The Defendant ABS filed a counterclaim seeking a declaratory judgement that 
Spain is obliged to indemnify ABS and/or contribute to payments because of 
Spain's alleged negligence in responding to the Prestige disaster. By a Memo- 
randum Order of 3 August 2004, the competent US District Court for the Southern 
District of New York dismissed the defendant ABS' counterclaim,91 accepting the 
plaintiff's contention that the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction for ABS' 
counterclaims because the Foreign Sovereignty Immunities Act (FSIA) bars them 99 
In discussing ABS' counterclaim the Court has determined that ABS has failed to 
94 Lloyd's List, 14 May 2003, p. 3. 
95 04 Civ. 671 (LTS) (RLE). 
I n  completing its 1973 "Rules for Building and Classing Steel Vessels", in 1993 ABS 
developed the ABS "Safe Hull" program that assessed the "fatigue life" and structural 
strength of steel vessels in light of certain fatigue criteria (Complaint, par. 33). 
97 ABS conducted an "annual class survey" of the Prestige in Dubai, United Arab Emirates 
from 15 to 26 May 2002. (Ibid., par. 37). 
98 Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules on Civil Procedure for lack of subject 
matter jurisdiction. 
99 28 U.S.C. par. 1602-1611 ("FSIA"). 
fulfil its burden of evidence that immunity shall not be granted under the statutory 
exceptions of the FSIA which require that the counterclaims arose from the same 
"transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the claim of the foreign 
State" at the time the pleading is served. Thus, in applying the identity and matu- 
rity test, the Court found that: 
"Plaintiffs' claims in the instant action concern alleged breaches by ABS of its 
duty to exercise care in inspecting and classifying the Prestige, namely, whether 
ABS inspections of the Prestige failed to identify the fatal structural weaknesses 
that led to the ship's disintegration, and/or whether ABS certified the Prestige 
for duty for which it was not in fact fit. ABS' counterclaims, however, relate to 
whether ABS is entitled to indemnification or contribution by Spain for any 
judgement ABS incurs "anywhere in the world" in connection with the 
Prestige-related litigation against it. Although both sets of claims relate to the 
Prestige oil spill, the relationship between the "core issues" presented by them 
is not sufficiently logical for them to arise from the same transaction within the 
meaning of the statutory exception. The issues presented by ABS' claims 
involve Spain's duties, if any, to ABS or others in connection with vessels in 
distress. Spain's claims, by contrast, involve whether ABS deviated from the 
proper practices of classification societies in its continuing certification of the 
Prestige. Those sets of issues are ... unrelated ... Moreover, ABS' counter- 
claims suffer from an even greater deficiency arising from the fact that it seeks 
indemnification and contribution for judgements it has not yet incurred, in 
favour of parties not yet identified, on the basis of claims not yet pleaded". 
For these reasons, the Memorandum Order issued by the Court on 3 August 2004, 
granted Spain's motion to dismiss the ABS counterclaim, thus leaving the way 
open for the follow up of the proceedings as they were initially formulated. In the 
current phase of the pleadings before the New York Federal Court, Spain has 
expanded the reach of its action so as also to include ABS Group and ABS 
Consulting, to prevent that in case of being found guilty, the mother Corporation 
ABS could allege its insolvency as a "non profit" entity. 
4. State responsibility 
With respect to issues regarding State responsibility the Prestige case has followed 
the usual trend in situations of environmental disasters, with some particular fea- 
tures. No claims for State responsibility have been formally presented, in spite of 
expressed concerns regarding the wrongfulness of certain governmental conducts. 
And, as in other similar cases, legal claims arising from damages suffered as a 
consequence of the accident have followed only international civil liability procedures. 
However, most surprisingly, the wrongfulness of the conduct of the victim State 
has occasionally been evoked in international fora, perhaps as a reflection of the 
strong political criticism voiced in domestic affairs. The most significant concern 
about the action taken by Spain in its intervention with respect to the Prestige 
casualty have been expressed by the Bahamas, the flag State, at the 21 st session 
of the IOPC Fund Executive Committee, held from 7 to 9 May 2003. Following 
the Spanish delegation's presentation on the Spanish authorities' response to the 
incident,'°° which was received with gratitude by a number of delegations: 
"The observer delegation of the Bahamas, the flag state of the Prestige, ex- 
pressed concern regarding the late submission of the document by the Spanish 
delegation and stated that the information contained in the document was 
counter to its own understanding of events. That delegation, whilst commend- 
ing the action of the Spanish rescue services in saving the lives of the crew of 
the Prestige, stated that in its view, had the authorities allowed the vessel to 
enter a port of refuge this would most likely have prevented the sinking of the 
vessel and reduced the amount of oil spilled. The Bahamas delegation stated 
that, despite a number of official requests, it had had difficulty obtaining infor- 
mation from the Spanish authorities for their own investigation into the cause 
of the incident".101 
The Spanish delegation expressed its deep dissatisfaction in respect of the inter- 
vention by the Bahamas delegation and this delegation in turn expressed its deep 
dissatisfaction in respect of the intervention by the Spanish delegation and reiter- 
ated its strong disagreement with the description of the incident put forward by the 
Spanish authori t ies  
Although confrontation between the Bahamas and Spain has continued after the 
presentation of their respective investigations into the cause of the accident in 
2005,103 it is unlikely that the responsibility of the victim State could be formally 
'°° See: Doc. 92.FUND/EXC.21/5, 9 May 2003, Record of Decisions of the Twenty-First 
Session of the Executive Committee: "The Spanish delegation mentioned that in manag- 
ing the crisis the Spanish authorities had pursued the following objectives: the saving of 
human life, combating the pollution, preventing the tanker from running aground and 
minimising the risks to the Spanish coast and its local population (par. 3.2.6). The 
Spanish delegation further mentioned that once the first three objectives had been suc- 
cessfully executed, the authorities had considered three possibilities for minimising the 
risks to the coast and its population, namely allowing the vessel entry into a port or 
other place of refuge, removal of part of the cargo at sea, or towing the tanker away 
from the coast to calm waters where a cargo transfer could take place. It was stated that 
after taking into account all the circumstances, including the risk posed by the struc- 
turally damaged ship, the hazards posed by the rocky and dangerous coastline and 
adverse weather conditions and the risks to the rich fisheries in the Galician estuaries, 
the authorities had decided to order the vessel to be towed away from the coast to calm 
waters to enable a lightering operation to be carried out. It was remarked that the deci- 
sion taken was in accordance with Spanish and EU legislation and was consistent with 
decisions taken in respect of previous major casualties" (par. 3.2.7). 
101 Ibid.., par. 3.2.12. 
'02 Ibid., pars. 3.2.13-3.2.14. 
103 The Bahamas Maritime Authority (BMA), the authority of the flag State, carried out an 
engaged with respect to international wrongful acts allegedly committed by Spain 
in responding to the Prestige casualty. After much debate about the Spanish 
authorities' decision to tow the Prestige. away from its coasts, it is quite doubtful 
that its decision violated any specific international legal norms applicable to the 
case at hand. It is also doubtful that Spain's intervention could be considered as 
contravening the proportionality and reasonability criteria established with respect 
to its right to take and enforce measures following upon a maritime casualty in 
accordance with international law, both customary and conventional. 10, 
It is, in contrast, all the more surprising that the responsibility of the flag State 
has not been questioned given the vast array of specific rules of international law 
binding on it with respect of ships flying its flag, particularly in cases of ships car- 
rying dangerous or noxious substances such as heavy oil. These international 
obligations also apply to States such as the Bahamas, considered as one of the 
examples of the States having "open registers" which are used to obtain "flags of 
convenience". As two distinguished international law scholars have written: 
"The more convincing proposition is not that international law prohibits flags 
of convenience, but that once a state has conferred the right to fly its flag, inter- 
national law requires it to exercise effective jurisdiction and control over the 
ship in administrative, technical, and social matters. Thus it is the flag state 
which is responsible for regulating safety at sea and the prevention of colli- 
sions, the manning of ships and the competence of their crews, and for setting 
standards of construction, design, equipment, and seaworthiness. These respon- 
sibilities also include taking measures to prevent pollution" .105 
Among the obligations binding on all flag States particular mention can be made 
of the following duties: a) "to take such measures for ships flying its flag as are 
cont. 
investigation into the cause of the accident. A brief summary of the report on the inves- 
tigation was presented to the Executive Committee at its March 2005 session (document 
92FUND/EXC.28/5, section 13.1). The discussion of the report at the session is reflected 
in the Record of Decisions (document 92FUND/EXC.28/8, paragraphs 3.4.52-3.4.60). 
The Spanish Ministry on Promotion has carried out an investigation into the cause of 
the incident through the Permanent Commission on the Investigation of Maritime 
Casualties (the Commission) that has the task of determining the technical causes of 
maritime accidents. The report of the investigation, which was made available to the 
1992 Fund in April 2005, extends to some 420 pages and contains a narrative of events, 
an analysis of the evidence, conclusions, recommendations and appendices. The report 
does not address blame or liability. See Doc. 92/FUND/EXC.29/4, 9 June 2005, par. 
13.1-13.3. and Doc. 92/FUND/EXC.29/6, 28 June 2005, Record of Decisions of the 
Twenty-Ninth Session of the Executive Committee, pars. 3.2.79-3.2.85. 
104 UNCLOS, Art. 221 and 1969 Intervention Convention. 
105 Birnie, P.; Boyle, A., lnternational Law and the Environment, (Clarendon Press - 
Oxford), 1992, p. 264. 
necessary to ensure safety at sea" with regard, inter alia, to its seaworthiness; 106 
b) to adopt laws and regulations for the prevention, reduction and control of pol- 
lution of the marine environment from vessels flying their flay;" and c) to ensure 
compliance by vessels flying their flag with applicable international rules and stan- 
dards and provide for the effective enforcement of such rules, standards, laws and 
regulations, irrespective of where a violation occurs.'°8 In this respect, Article 
217.2 of UNCLOS affirms that: 
"States shall, in particular, take appropriate measures in order to ensure that 
vessels flying their flag or of their registry are prohibited from sailing, until 
they can proceed to sea in compliance with the requirements of the international 
rules and standards referred to in paragraph 1, including requirements in respect 
of design, construction, equipment and manning of vessels". 
Moreover, the draft Articles on Prevention of Transboundary Harm from Hazar- 
dous Activities, adopted by the UN International Law Commission in 2001,109 pro- 
vide for a series of special rules which also bind upon flag States with respect to 
their ships carrying dangerous substances.110 And it should be also recalled that, as 
pointed out by Birnie and Boyle, "(a) number of authors have argued that in re- 
spect to ultrahazardous activities at sea, such as the operation of large oil tankers, 
the liability of the flag State is strict ..."."' 1
As provided for in Article 235 of UNCLOS, regarding responsibility and lia- 
bility, "States are responsible for the fulfilment of their international obligations 
concerning the protection and preservation of the marine environment. They shall 
be liable in accordance with international law". However, once again, in the case 
'°° UNCLOS, Art. 94.3, a). 
107 UNCLOS, Art. 211.2. 
108 UNCLOS, Art. 217.1. 
109 See: Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its Fifty-third session, 
Official records of the General Assembly Fifty-sixth session, Suplement no. 10 (A/56/ 
10), Chapter V, pp. 337-436. 
"° As explained in the commentary of the draft Articles, "the prime example of such a sit- 
uation is innocent passage of a foreign ship through the territorial sea. In such situations, 
if the activity leading to significant transboundary harm emanates from the foreign ship, 
the flag State and not the territorial State must comply with the provisions of the pre- 
sent articles" (Report of the International Law Commission ...  cit., p. 384 (8). One of 
the special rules contained in the draft articles affirms that: "The State of origin shall, 
without delay and by the most expeditious means, at its disposal, notify the State likely 
to be affected of an emergency concerning an activity within the scope of the present 
articles and provide it with all relevant and available information" (Article 17). 
"' Birnie, P.; Boyle, A., op. cit., p. 264, quoting Smith, B. D., State Responsibility and the 
Marine Environment. The Rules of Decision, Oxford, 1988, pp. 114-118; 160-163; 
210-213 and Handle, G. "State Liability for Accidental Transnational Environmental Damage 
by Private Persons", American Journal of International Law, 74, 1980, p. 547. 
of the Prestige no claims have been made by affected States with respect to other 
States' accountability for marine pollution. 
C O N C L U S I O N  
To face an oil spill is not a new problem in international law. However, the inten- 
sity and the increasing frequency of oil spills all over the world, as well as their 
catastrophic environmental and economic consequences for the coastal States 
affected, make evident the need to reconsider some of the most deeply rooted 
norms of international law, such as the dogma of freedom of navigation. The phe- 
nomenon of oil spills also questions other norms, such as the pre-eminent juris- 
diction of the flag State over the design, construction, manning and equipment of 
their ships until stricter development of generally accepted international rules or 
standards take place. The same can be said with respect to the persistent limita- 
tion of liability of the polluter until it is lifted to a new ceiling, still allowing the 
polluter not to compensate for all the damages caused. Other tolerated practices, 
such as the existence of flags of convenience or the utilization of substandard tank- 
ers for the carriage of dangerous and ultrahazardous substances or goods reflect 
the need to revise a complex set of norms in order to enjoy safer navigation. 
Accidents like the Prestige always generate some pressure for the development 
of new norms aimed at preventing the repetition of the same type of disaster. The 
emerging right of coastal States not to tolerate irresponsible navigation of danger- 
ous ships through their waters, the development of stricter monitoring and inspec- 
tion procedures, the establishment of places or ports of refuge, the institution of 
Particularly Sensitive Sea Areas or the accelerated withdrawal of single hull oil tankers 
are some of the most important legal developments that are taking place after the 
Prestige accident. Obviously, if these new legal developments are correctly imple- 
mented, they will contribute to safer navigation. 
But questions still arise. Are these measures sufficient? Is the international com- 
munity able to impose and require responsible navigation? The answers seem 
mostly in the negative. Even after the Prestige accident, the flag State maintains 
most of its legal privileges, still living in a golden paradise. No one has asked for 
the international responsibility of a flag State not ensuring the safety of their tanks; 
the limited compensation for damages is channelled through private liability sys- 
tems not affecting the flag State; private insurance companies and the IOPC fund 
will have to pay for its negligence, never the flag State. As one author put it "As 
the ship goes down, flag State jurisdiction goes down with it. And it is left to others 
to clean the mess"."z 
"2 Fleischer, K. A. "Implementation of the Convention in the Light of Customary Inter- 
national Law, Prior Treaty Regimes and Domestic Law" in Vidas, D. and Ostreng, W. 
(editors) Order for the Oceans at the Turn of the Century, 1999, p. 529. 
Even the situation of the victim State has not significantly improved. Although 
a new IOPC Supplementary Fund has been created as a consequence of the 
Prestige accident, this fund will not apply retroactively to the case at hand. In fact, 
Spain still faces two main risks for its diligent reaction to an environmental dis- 
aster caused by a foreign tanker. First, having spent more than 1,000 million in 
response to the damages resulting from the accident, it has only received an 
advance sum of 57.5 million from the 1992 Fund, and it seems clear that Spain 
will be reimbursed only in a small part for the costs already incurred. Second, 
although currently trial is still pending, there is the possibility of Spain being con- 
demned, on a subsidiary basis, if the Court accepts the charges of reckless con- 
duct formulated against the Director General of Merchant Shipping in office at the 
time of the accident. None of these risks are for the flag State, the Bahamas, or 
the polluting vessels, but for the victim State. In these circumstances, it can be 
held that nowadays to pollute is still a good business not adequately sanctioned by 
international law. 
